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ARTICLES
COMPARATIVE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Jeffrey A. Parness*
I. INTRODUCTION
Far too often when we discuss American courts and their judicial
systems, we take little note of the significant differences in the
ways in which cases are handled and law is practiced. We probably
contemplate the dichotomy between trial and appellate courts; be-
tween rural and urban courts; between general and special jurisdic-
tion courts; between state and federal courts; between courts with
elected and selected judges; and between civil and criminal courts.
We also surely contemplate the differences in attitudes, work hab-
its, ideology, staff and the like which separate individual judges,
and we inevitably contemplate the divergent judicial approaches to
the balance of individual and societal interests. In the last decade,
there has been special attention paid to fundamental rights, partic-
ularly those normally asserted within the judicial branch; including
search and seizure, jury trial, self-incrimination, speedy trial, com-
petent counsel, public access, cruel and unusual punishment, and
confrontation.
What we so frequently miss in our discussion of case manage-
ment and legal practice are the differences in the constitutional
foundations of the varying American judicial systems. Not only is
the judicial article of the federal constitution dramatically differ-
ent from the judicial articles of many states, but also the judicial
articles of many states are quite distinct from one another. Fur-
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., 1970, Colby Col-
lege; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago Law School. Much of this paper was first presented at
the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association.
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ther, quite unlike article III of the federal constitution,' many
state judicial articles have undergone significant alterations.
Perhaps the failure to discuss differences in American judicial
articles can be attributed to the view that any differences in consti-
tutional foundation are meaningless in that no practical conse-
quences flow. In effect, this view parallels the popular notion that
all seemingly comparable courts in America actually have compa-
rable powers and that whatever differences exist originate from
such non-constitutional sources as political ideology and commu-
nity setting. This view of comparability is troubling, for constitu-
tional differences should (and sometimes do) result in practical
consequences. Under current American constitutional law, all
American trial courts should not (and do not) possess the same
power to make substantive law. All American courts of last resort
should not (and do not) possess the same inherent authority to
regulate the practice of law. Moreover, all American courts should
not (and do not) possess the same responsibility for checking legis-
lative inroads on judicial prerogatives.
This article will first explore some of the differences between
federal and state judicial articles, as well as some of the differences
over time in the judicial article of a single state. More serious con-
sideration of the noted differences in constitutional language is en-
couraged. The conclusion is that an increased sensitivity to differ-
ences in individual rights from state to state, and between the
federal and state governments, should develop a heightened recog-
nition of, and respect for, differences in the structure, function and
operation of the judicial systems contemplated by the American
constitutions.
II. THE FEDERAL AND ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONS
A brief comparison of the present federal and Illinois judicial ar-
ticles demonstrate the variety of approaches to judicial power in
American constitutional law.
Article III of the Federal Constitution2 has remained unchanged
since its inception (except for the eleventh amendment's 3 unclear
directives about sovereign immunity which affects Article III). The
1. U.S. CONsT. art. III; see infra notes 2-6.
2. U.S. CONST. art. III.
3. Id. amend. XI.
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article provides that the federal judicial power "shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."4 Under its provi-
sions, federal court jurisdiction, procedure, and financial support
have been generally recognized as subject to congressional man-
date. Further, legislative authority over federal courts is recognized
in other articles, exemplified by the article I grant to Congress of
the power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" 5
and by the article IV grant to Congress of the power over the terri-
tory of the United States.6
By contrast, the varying judicial articles in Illinois history
demonstrate an increasing judicial, and a diminishing legislative
responsibility for defining judicial power. They also have increas-
ingly prompted state, rather than local, financing of Illinois courts.
Under the Illinois Constitution of 1818,7 the powers of govern-
ment were divided between the legislative, executive and judicial
departments. No department was to exercise any powers of an-
other unless "expressly directed or permitted."8 The legislative de-
partment was, however, expressly granted significant duties re-
garding the judicial department. For example, one provision said:
"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme
court, and such inferior courts as the general assembly shall . . .
ordain and establish."9 This provision tracks article III. Other
early Illinois provisions authorized the legislature to require high
court justices to "hold circuit courts", 10 as well as to provide for
the appointment and duties of justices of the peace.11
Under the Illinois Constitution of 1848,12 legislative duties re-
garding the Illinois courts were continued but reduced. The legisla-
ture could authorize "courts of justice" to grant divorces' 3 and
could direct "in what manner suits may be brought against the
state."' 4 It could no longer require high court justices to "hold cir-
4. Id. art. III, § 1.
5. Id. art. I, § 8.
6. Id. art. IV, § 3.
7. ILL. CONST. of 1818.
8. Id. art. I, § 2.
9. Id. art. IV, § 1.
10. Id. § 4.
11. Id. § 8.
12. ILL. CONST. of 1848.
13. Id. art. III, § 32.
14. Id. § 34.
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cuit courts."15 Most importantly, the legislature's total control over
lower court structure was eliminated. A new provision declared:
The judicial power of this state shall be and is hereby vested in one
supreme court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justices of
the peace: Provided, that inferior local courts ...may be estab-
lished by the general assembly in the cities ...but such courts
shall have uniform organization and jurisdiction ...."
No longer were all lower courts ordained and established by the
legislature. Further, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was de-
fined constitutionally.17 Such lower officials as county judges and
justices of the peace continued, however, to be subject to signifi-
cant legislative directive. 8
Under the Illinois Constitution, as amended in 1870, there was a
further erosion of legislative authority over judicial power. The
General Assembly could not pass local or special laws regulating
practice in courts of justice, regulating the jurisdiction and duties
of certain judges, concerning changes of venue, summoning and
impaneling juries, or concerning any other area where a general law
could be applicable. 9 Furthermore, legislative control over the ju-
dicial power in the lower courts was diminished, as exemplified by
the new provisions on the jurisdictional authority of county and
probate courts.2" Nevertheless, the 1870 constitution continued to
permit significant legislative control over some courts. It expressly
recognized legislative authority to create "inferior appellate
courts,"'" and to establish a "probate court in each county having a
population over 50,000. ' '22
General Assembly responsibility for courts was dramatically re-
duced in the constitutional amendments of 1962. One amendment
provided: "The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."23 No longer were lower courts
to be established legislatively. Other amendments wholly or sub-
15. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 4.
16. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 1.
17. Id. § 8.
18. Id. §§ 18, 19.
19. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22.
20. Id. art. VI, §§ 18, 20.
21. Id. § 11.
22. Id. § 20.
23. Id. § 1 (1962).
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stantially eliminated legislative authority over the jurisdiction of
lower courts.24 In addition, an amendment declared that the su-
preme court was vested with "[g]eneral administrative authority
over all courts," with no express recognition of the opportunity for
legislative review.25
The movement toward increased constitutional authority for Illi-
nois courts continued under the 1970 constitution. Thus, while a
1962 amendment granted the Supreme Court of Illinois the au-
thority to provide by rule for direct appeal in certain cases from
the circuit courts to the high court "subject to law hereafter en-
acted, ' 26 the 1970 constitution recognized such supreme court rules
without mentioning the impact of legislation. In addition, the
1970 constitution declared that the "Supreme Court shall adopt
rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges," with no men-
tion of legislative review. 28
The trend in Illinois is clear. Constitutional history from 1818 to
1970 reflects diminishing legislative control of the Illinois judicial
system. Over the years, the General Assembly's power to create
courts and procedural law for the legal profession has diminished.
Increasingly, constitutional mandates appear regarding the struc-
ture of courts and their powers. Such mandates, where ambiguous,
are ultimately clarified by judges. Thus, judges increasingly are
compelled in Illinois to define the contours of their own constitu-
tional duties, as well as the necessary means by which such duties
must be undertaken. Ironically, while General Assembly control
over court jurisdiction and procedure has lessened, its assumption
of the financial burden of Illinois courts has grown.
The division of responsibilities in Illinois contrasts sharply with
the jurisdictional and procedural law duties performed by federal
legislators and judges. Article III of the United States Constitution
has always dictated that federal judicial power is "vested . . . in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
29
24. Compare ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12 with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 9 (1962)
(circuit court); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11 with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 7 (1962)
(appellate court).
25. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 2 (1962).
26. Id. § 5 (1962).
27. ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 4(b).
28. Id. § 13(a).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, c. 1.
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III. OTHER AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
The differences in American constitutional provisions relating to
judicial systems are magnified when other states' histories and cur-
rent circumstances are examined. Generally, the trend in the states
has been toward constitutionalizing the judiciary and its responsi-
bilities-a pattern reflected in Illinois. The trend was fueled, if not
fired, by the push for unified state court systems.30 The push was
prompted by concerns about the multiplicity of courts, the exis-
tence of concurrent jurisdiction, the congestion in the courts and
the inefficient use of judges. It is exemplified by Roscoe Pound's
famous 1906 address on the causes of popular dissatisfaction with
the administration of justice1.3 The movement toward constitution-
alization was made easier in the twentieth century by the efforts of
such national organizations as the American Bar Association, the
American Judicature Society and the National Municipal League.2
Because of the incompleteness of the movement toward constitu-
tionally defining American judicial systems, and because some
states have moved further than Illinois, many states presently have
provisions in their judicial articles quite different from article III
and from any of the previously mentioned Illinois provisions. Con-
sider the variety of constitutional provisions which now exist re-
garding judicial promulgation of standards governing legal prac-
tice, including rules of civil, criminal, and appellate procedure,
rules of evidence, and rules of attorney and judicial conduct.
Article III of the United States Constitution3 3 contains no ex-
press provision on judicial authority to promulgate legal practice
standards; to the extent that federal judicial rulemaking exists, it
is chiefly dependent upon statutes which delegate to judges
rulemaking powers.3 4 These statutes reserve opportunity for Con-
gressional oversight prior to the effectiveness of most judicially-
promulgated rules.3 5 By contrast, the Illinois judicial article does
30. For a description of the concept of and movement toward unified court systems, see
Ashman & Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1974).
31. Address by Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Ratification with the Administra-
tion of Justice, reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 55 (1962).
32. Ashman & Parness, supra note 30, at 2-17.
33. U.S. CONST. art. III.
34. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072, 2075, 2076 (1982). These provisions authorize the
Supreme Court to exercise general rule-making power; prescribe, by general rules, the for-
mal process, writs, pleadings, motions, practice and procedure regarding the rules of civil
procedure and bankruptcy; and prescribe amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
35. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (civil procedure rules are not to take effect until 90
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expressly provide for certain judicial rulemaking, including rules
regarding certain appeals and rules of conduct for judges.5 6 These
provisions do not mention legislative oversight. In other states,
there is even greater express recognition of judicial rulemaking
power. Among the states, constitutional provisions on judicial
rulemaking vary greatly in the role assigned to the legislature.
A more expansive judicial rulemaking power expressly recog-
nized in the constitutional text is the provision from Arkansas
which states: "The Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the
practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law."'37
A different, but comparably broad, constitutional delegation of ju-
dicial rulemaking power is found in the Missouri provision empow-
ering the supreme court to "establish rules relating to practice,
procedure and pleading for all courts."38 On occasion, state judicial
articles recognize expressly not only judicial rulemaking power, but
also legislative authority to establish standards guiding the courts.
Some articles also recognize legislative authority to delegate to the
judiciary the power to make rules. A provision in Colorado
declares:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the
administration of all courts and shall make and promulgate rules
governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except
that the general assembly shall have the power to provide simplified
procedures in county courts for claims not exceeding five hundred
dollars and for the trial of misdemeanors. 39
In North Carolina, legislative authority over the procedural rules
of trial courts is expressly recognized, though the possible delega-
tion of such authority is noted.40
While the United States Constitution makes no mention of judi-
cial rulemaking, and the Illinois judicial rulemaking provisions
make no mention of legislative oversight, other American constitu-
tions vary significantly in the role assigned to the legislature in the
days after they are reported to Congress) with 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982) (180-day waiting
period for amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence to take effect after they are reported
to Congress).
36. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6, 13(a).
37. ARK. CONsT. amend. 28.
38. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 5.
39. COLO. CONsT. art. VI, § 21.
40. N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 13(2).
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judicial establishment of standards governing legal practice. Some
provisions mandate that judicial rules not contravene any existing
statutes,4 ' while others dictate that judicial rules not conflict with
existing statutes addressing only certain issues.42 However, other
provisions seemingly permit judicial rules to supercede statutes.43
State constitutions vary on whether judicial rulemakers must
submit their rules to the legislature before the rules can take ef-
fect. As noted earlier, the Illinois provisions fail to mention any
legislative oversight. In Ohio, certain proposed judicial rules can-
not take effect unless the houses of the general assembly have been
afforded the chance to adopt "a concurrent resolution of disap-
proval." '44 In South Carolina, certain rules operate under similar
constraints, with disapproval occurring with "the concurrence of
three-fifths of the members of each House present and voting. 45
By contrast, some state constitutions contemplate that the work
of judicial rulemakers is usually overseen by the legislature only
after the rules take effect. In Florida, the supreme court can adopt
certain rules without first referring them to the legislature; but,
these judicially-promulgated rules "may be repealed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the
legislature. '46 In Maryland, certain judicial rules only have force
"until rescinded, changed or modified . . . by law.''47 In Montana,
certain judicial rules are "subject to disapproval by the legislature
in either of the two sessions following promulgation. '48
Besides constitutional differences in the structure, jurisdictional
authority, and rulemaking powers of American courts, significant
divergence can also be found in such areas as court finance, the
techniques of choosing and removing judges, the terms of judicial
office, and judicial responsibility for rendering advisory opinions at
the request of the legislature. Certain courts are state-financed
41. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25.
42. See Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5(A) (rules cannot change the substantive rights or law relat-
ing to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right to trial by jury, or the
right of appeal).
43. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (exclusive high court authority to make rules of proce-
dure and practice for the appellate courts).
44. OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 5(B) (practice and procedure rules for all courts of the state).
45. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(A) (practice and procedure rules for all courts of the state).
46. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (practice and procedure rules).
47. MD. CONsT. art. IV, § 18(a) (practice and procedure rules).
48. MONT. CONsT. art. VII, § 2(3) (practice and procedure rules, professional conduct
rules, and appellate procedure rules).
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while others are locally-financed. Judges may be elected in partisan
or non-partisan elections. American judges serve terms ranging
from two to fifteen years. State high courts may or may not have to
advise the legislature on the legality of proposed statutes. Varia-
tions among American governments in these areas should result in
further differences in the separation of powers, particularly in the
relationships between the legislative and judicial branches.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUDICIAL
ARTICLES
So what of these differences in constitutional laws relating to
American judicial systems? How might they properly influence the
resolution of troubling issues now facing American courts?
Consider first issues involving legislative authority to remove re-
sponsibility for resolving civil disputes from traditional courts es-
tablished under a judicial article and to place such responsibility in
administrative agencies, quasi-courts or others. Such removals are
increasingly attractive to legislators concerned with the extreme
delays in, as well as the high costs of, traditional litigation. Even
with an expressly-recognized right to trial by jury, should not such
a removal be easier for a legislature if that body is chiefly responsi-
ble for defining the jurisdictional authority of the state's judiciary?
Is not removal more problematic where trial court authority over
the diverted cases is constitutionally-recognized?
Consider, by comparison, issues involving legislative authority to
place caps on certain kinds of damages, such as non-economic
damages in tort actions, or to abolish certain kinds of damages al-
together such as punitive damages. Should not such legislative au-
thority be easier to sustain if the state courts' jurisdictional powers
are not constitutionally defined but subject to legislative inven-
tion? A court whose power to hear a case is dependent upon legis-
lative will is in a seemingly weaker position to question such a cap
than is a court invested with the constitutional responsibility to
hear and resolve the case. In other words, the power to make com-
mon law rulings contravening statutes is more doubtful when the
power to adjudicate the dispute is itself dependent upon statute.
Courts looking to strike down such damage caps as an infringe-
ment on judicial authority have focused on the constitutionally-
protected right to jury trial rather than on their own constitution-
1990]
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ally-assigned power to resolve disputes.4" This seems wrong, be-
cause the jury is infrequently viewed as the determiner of the sub-
stantive law and thus the jury typically is asked only to apply the
facts it finds to the law determined by others.
Consider, similarly, issues involving legislative responsibility to
fund courts in an adequate manner. Should not such a responsibil-
ity be taken more seriously if huge backlogs in the processing of
civil cases exist and if the relevant judicial article dictates court
responsibility for such cases (especially if individual constitutional
interests such as jury trial, access to the courts, and a remedy for
every wrong are at stake)? Recently, the Los Angeles County Bar
Association sued various state officers to get more state court
judges. When the suit was initiated, the typical non-priority civil
suit took "at least 58 months to [get] to trial despite a state law
requiring dismissal of untried cases after five years. ' 50 A suit of
this nature might be founded on the infringement of individual
constitutional rights, such as the right to a speedy trial-albeit for
civil case, or the right not to have the civil jury trial right abol-
ished de facto. However, the suit could also be grounded on sepa-
ration of powers principles involving undue legislative interference
with judicial responsibility.
Also, consider issues involving the responsibility for guiding the
practice of law, including regulations on admission to legal prac-
tice, on the discipline of those so admitted, on judicial ethics, and
on the conduct of non-lawyers constituting the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. Many courts simply note their inherent powers and
then proceed to declare the responsibility for guiding legal practice
lies with the judiciary. Should not such inherent authority be eas-
ier to sustain if the courts are constitutionally established and em-
powered? If the high court is given the constitutional duty to hear
admission to practice and lawyer discipline cases or if the high
court or some other body of judges is constitutionally delegated
express rulemaking powers over court practices and procedures,
then would inherent authority not be easier to sustain as well?
Courts whose creation, jurisdiction and rules are dependent upon
some form of legislative initiative seemingly derive their power
over legal practice from the statutes. Such power, when balanced
49. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, -, 757 P.2d
251, 258 (1988).
50. Marcotte, L.A. County Bar Sues California, 74 A.B.A. J. Feb. 1, 1988, at 28.
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against legislative authority, seems much weaker than judicial
power inhering in constitutional provisions.
The importance of the differences in American judicial articles
can be demonstrated finally by reviewing a few judicial actions
concerning legislative authority over the ways in which judges pro-
mulgate legal practice rules. In particular, this discussion will focus
upon two judicial actions in 1977 involving statutes requiring that
judicial rulemaking hearings be noticed and open to the public.
In the first action, the Michigan high court sent a letter to Mich-
igan's Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House of
Representatives. 1 The court was concerned about the recently
adopted Open Meetings Act. Under the Act, certain notice and ac-
cess requirements were applied "to a court while exercising rule-
making authority and while deliberating or deciding upon the issu-
ance of administrative orders. ' 52 The court declared these require-
ments to be an unconstitutional "intrusion into the most basic
day-to-day exercise of the constitutionally derived judicial pow-
ers."' 53 The court's declaration was founded on the belief that
"rulemaking, supervisory and other administrative powers" were
"exclusively entrusted to the judiciary by the Constitution."54 The
court cited constitutional provisions in support of their position,
specifically vesting general superintending control over all state
courts in the supreme court and conferring upon the high court the
power to make rules governing practice and procedure.5
The decision by the Michigan court is reasonable considering the
express constitutional approval of judicial rules and orders and
considering the absence of any language regarding legislative in-
volvement or oversight in such matters. An examination of the
Michigan Constitution reveals the drafters used express language
when related legislative activity was deemed appropriate or when
judicial powers were to be constrained. Recognition of legislative
involvement in matters of judicial rulemaking is found in the con-
stitutional provision which states: "The jurisdiction of the court of
appeals should be provided by law and the practice and procedure
therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court."56 Limits
51. In re "Sunshine Law," 400 Mich. 660, -, 255 N.W.2d 635, 635 (1977).
52. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 636.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
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on judicial rulemaking power are found in the constitutional provi-
sion stating: "The supreme court shall by general rules establish
...the practice and procedure in all courts. . . .The distinctions
between law and equity . . . shall . . . be abolished. The office of
master in chancery is prohibited. 5 7 Similarly, while recognizing
the high court's power to determine prerogative and remedial
writs, the constitution expressly prohibits the court from removing
a judge.5"
In the second action in 1977, the Nevada high court heard a pe-
tition challenging a statute requiring openness in judicial proceed-
ings involving the "consideration of rules or deliberation upon the
issuance of administrative orders." ' The statute was deemed "an
unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judici-
ary which violates the doctrine of separation of powers.""0 Five Ne-
vada high court rulings were cited which purportedly supported
the contention that the judiciary has "inherent powers to adminis-
ter its affairs, . . . which include rulemaking and other incidental
powers . . . required for the administration of justice."' The court
noted that "these inherent powers exist independent of constitu-
tional or statutory grant,"6 2 presumably meaning that they exist
although not expressly recognized by written law. In addition, the
court found "the only logical and legitimate source" of judicial
rulemaking powers to be the constitutional provision vesting the
state's judicial power in a court system which includes the supreme
court. 3 The court concluded by noting the inherent power to make
rules was "absolutely essential to the effective and efficient admin-
istration of our judicial system. '6 4 The court's decision was fol-
lowed by a concurring opinion which suggested another constitu-
tional basis, a provision granting the chief justice and the high
court "the power and duty to supervise administration of Nevada's
court system. '6 5
The Nevada decision is surprisingly conclusory about the terms
57. Id. § 5.
58. Id. § 4.
59. Goldberg v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 93 Ne. 614, -, 572 P.2d 521, 521 n.1 (1977).
60. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 522.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 523 n.6.
64. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 523.
65. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 523 (Gunderson, J., concurring) (referring to NEv. CONST. art.
VI, as amended § 19).
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of the constitution it does cite. It is also misleading about provi-
sions it does not cite and is unconsciously disrespectful of constitu-
tional schemes in sister states. The reliance on separation of pow-
ers to support the decision is too conclusory. As demonstrated by
experience in other American states, the protections afforded by
separation of powers are not inconsistent with significant legisla-
tive involvement in judicial rulemaking, either by early oversight
or subsequent modification. Similarly, in the Article III federal
courts where judicial rulemaking is authorized by statute, there ex-
ist limits within which such authority may be exercised, including
the use of advisory committees.
The Nevada high court ruling is misleading with regard to the
constitutional scheme of the state government. While exhorting
the principle of separation of powers, the court cited the "perti-
nent" part of the Nevada Constitution, article VI section 1,66 which
vests the judicial power in three courts, including the supreme
court.6 7 The court did not cite the part of section 1 which states:
"The Legislature may also establish, as part of the system, Courts
for municipal purposes only in incorporated cities and towns. ' 68
Beyond the power to establish municipal courts, the state legisla-
ture also has the constitutional authority to determine the jurisdic-
tion of both justices of the peace, 9 and the district courts. 70 In
Nevada, there is constitutional recognition of significant legislative
involvement in creating and guiding certain courts. Such courts
must be beyond any exclusive domain maintained by judges.
The Nevada court's assertion that the inherent judicial power to
make rules is "absolutely essential" to effective and efficient judi-
cial administration is disrespectful of the policy in other states. As
noted earlier, many states grant their legislatures significant re-
sponsibilities for court rules-including the creation of codes of
procedure. Such states would not consciously choose ineffective
and inefficient means of administering courts. In Nevada, the high
court would have difficulty demonstrating the inferiority of those
states' judicial systems or some special circumstances relevant to
Nevada.
66. NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
67. Goldberg, 93 Nev. at -, 572 P.2d at 523 n.6.
68. NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
69. Id. at § 8.
70. Id. at § 6.
1990]
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Examination of the five cases cited in support of the use of in-
herent powers demonstrates further that the Nevada Supreme
Court's tenuous basis for finding that inherent judicial powers re-
garding all court rules were immunized from legislative action. In
State ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis,7 1 the high court spoke of the in-
herent judicial power to override legislative funding decisions in-
terfering with the exercise of the high court's "constitutional juris-
diction. '7 12 Young v. Board of County Commissioners7 3 also
involved funding, but unlike Kitzmeyer, Young did not involve a
state statute under which the relevant court's funding action could
be fully sustained without assertions of inherent powers.7 4 How-
ever, each case involved funding for a court performing significant
constitutionally-assigned tasks of adjudication. Sun Realty v.
Eighth Judicial District Court7 5 involved a perceived misuse of in-
herent powers by the trial court.7 6 Sun Realty involved the condi-
tions which would be set during litigation for a retrial. The case
failed to support a later decision employing the inherent powers
concept in a rulemaking setting. The fourth case, Dunphy v.
Sheehan,77 involved the financial disclosure component of an Eth-
ics in Government Law. In Dunphy, the court applauded the legis-
lature for excluding the judiciary, indicating that the promulgation
of a judicial ethics code was within the judiciary's inherent power
and could not be touched by statute. 8 In so doing, the Nevada
court cited support from only a Wisconsin high court ruling.79 In
the Dunphy decision, the court did note that the topic of financial
disclosure statements was "under consideration" during discus-
sions on the judicially-promulgated Canons of Judicial Conduct.80
The final case referenced by the Nevada Supreme Court, City of
North Las Vegas v. Daines8' involved the inherent power of mu-
nicipal courts to dismiss court administrators appointed by city
managers. The case addressed a dismissal based on an administra-
tor's adherence to a manager's directives requiring reduced over-
71. 26 Nev. 373, 69 P. 689 (1902).
72. Id. at -, 68 P. at 691.
73. 91 Nev. 52, 530 P.2d 1203 (1975).
74. Id.
75. 91 Nev. 774, 542 P.2d 1072 (1975).
76. Id. at -, 542 P.2d at 1073.
77. 92 Nev. 259, 549 P.2d 332 (1976).
78. Id. at -, 549 P.2d at 336.
79. Id. (citing In re Kading, 70 Wis. 408, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)).
80. Id. at -, 549 P.2d at 337.
81. 92 Nev. 292, 550 P.2d 399 (1976).
[Vol. 24:171
COMPARATIVE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
time work by bailiffs and warrant officers and on an administra-
tor's disobedience of judicial directives on holding night sessions of
the municipal court.8 2 The City administrator urged there was no
inherent court power to dismiss because the municipal court was of
legislative, and not constitutional; creation.8 3 The high court re-
jected the argument, finding municipal courts did exercise "judicial
power" described in the constitution and were thus in need of
"freedom and independence. '8 4
In three of the decisions in 1977 by the Nevada high court, the
inherent powers concept was sustained in settings where judicial
ability to carry out adjudicatory assignments was threatened. In
the fourth, the concept was rejected for it was applied "to the han-
dling of controversies between litigants" (payment of attorney's
fees as condition of new trial) rather than to "the administration of
the judicial system" wherein the court's adjudicatory function was
threatened. 5 Only in the case involving a financial disclosure law
for judges was there a matter arguably beyond the realm of adjudi-
cation. Like an open meetings law, such legislatively-compelled
disclosures involve regulation of judicial conduct unrelated to adju-
dication. While there may be insignificant differences between laws
on judicial rulemaking and laws on financial disclosure by judges,
and there may be good reasons why both areas should be left to
judicial regulation, where such regulatory authority inheres and
why such regulatory authority is "absolutely essential" warrants a
more complete discussion than was provided by the Nevada Su-
preme Court in 1977. The argument that financial disclosure laws
and open meeting laws infringe upon judicial power in similar ways
seems problematic. Financial disclosure laws involve regulation of
a form of legal practice and the fairness of the decision making
process during litigation, long recognized as areas suitable for high
court initiative.86 Open meeting laws involve the quasi-legislative
82. Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 400 n.1.
83. Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 400.
84. Id.
85. Sun Realty v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 91 Nev. 774, -, 542 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (1975).
86. Incidentally, there are some states today where legislation requires financial disclosure
statements by judges. See Rosenbaum and Lubet, Financial Disclosure By Judges: Func-
tional Analysis and Critique, 40 U. FLA. L. REv., 241, 245 n.10 (1988). See also, Duplantier
v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. den. 449 U.S. 1076 (1981) (upholding, in
a separation of powers challenge, the federal Ethics in Government Act's requirements of
financial disclosure by judges). Legislatures, as well, sometimes place restrictions on the
techniques of judicial rulemaking. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2077 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (restrictions
on federal appeals courts' rulemaking).
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process for drafting future standards, long recognized as distinct
from the adjudicatory process with which judges are accustomed.
V. CONCLUSION
Significant variations exist in American constitutional provisions
on the judiciary. These variations frequently suggest that there
ought to exist very different relationships between the relevant leg-
islative and judicial branches. Yet, often these variations are over-
looked. As a result, there has developed a sense of comparability
which incorrectly presumes that legislative and judicial roles in
overseeing legal practice are similar from state to state. It is time
to acknowledge the differences in constitutional articles establish-
ing state judicial systems and to appreciate the varying approaches
state governments have chosen to the balance between legislative
and judicial authority over the exercises of judicial power and the
practice of law.
